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IV.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals denies the DeBrys due

process of law.
2.

The decision of the Court of Appeals reverses the policy

of this Court to construe pleadings to allow a case to be heard on
its merits.
3.

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals encourages litigants

to disregard procedural rules and requirements.
4.

Construction of the DeBrys1 Rule 4-504 objections to the

form of proposed findings as a Rule 52(b) motion denies to the
DeBrys their right to an appeal guaranteed by Art. VIII, § 5 of the
Utah Constitution.
V.
OFFICIAL REPORTS
This case is reported as DeBry v. Fidelity National Title
Insurance Co., 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. 1992) (a copy of
the Opinion in found in the Appendix, Ex. C.)
VI.
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals opinion was filed on March 18, 1992. The
Court of Appeals filed its order denying appellants' Petition for
Rehearing on April 24, 1992. This court signed an order dated May
12, 1992 extending the date for filing a petition for Writ of
Certiorari to June 23, 1992.

1

This court has jurisdiction to grant certiorari pursuant to
Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2 and Rules 45-51, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the trial court, the DeBrys filed a pleading titled "Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law" as allowed by Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of
Judicial Administration2

(See Exhibit D ) .

If that pleading (Exhibit D) is interpreted to be objections
to a proposed order [as it is titled and as allowed by Rule 4504(2)], the DeBrys' notice of appeal was timely filed and the
Court of Appeals should have exercised jurisdiction to hear the
DeBrys' appeal on its merits.

However, if that pleading (Exhibit

D) is interpreted to be a Rule 52(b) motion to amend an existing
order3(contrary to the caption and substance of the pleading) ; then
the DeBrys' notice of appeal was prematurely filed and the Court of
2

Rule 4-504(2) provides: copies of the proposed findings,
judgments, and orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before
being presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the
court and counsel within five days of service. (Emphasis added.)
3

Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Upon
motion of a party made no later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be
made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When
findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a
jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party
raising the question has made in the district court an objection of
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
2

Appeals had a legal basis to dismiss the DeBrys1 appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. See. Facts Section below.
VIII.
FACTS
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance Company ("Fidelity") and
certified the case for appeal under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P.
Twenty seven days later on April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand
delivered proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment to the DeBrys1 counsel. (See Exhibit E, Appendix).
On April 25, 1990, Fidelity served copies of the proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment to all other
counsel in the case. (Exhibit F, Appendix).
On May 2, 1990, the court signed the proposed findings and
judgment submitted by Fidelity. (Exhibit G, Appendix).
On May 7, 1990, the DeBrys1 counsel filed objections to the
form of the order as allowed by Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.
Upon learning the judgment was signed, the DeBrys assumed
their objections to the form of the order were moot and they filed
a notice of appeal. (Exhibit H, Appendix).

For the next seven

months it appears Fidelity also assumed the objections were moot
since it filed no pleadings related to resolution of a Rule 52(b)
Motion.

See Point III, infra.

Approximately seven months later, Fidelity, ex parte, obtained
the signature of the trial court on an order which purported to
3

deny a Rule 52(b) motion to alter or amend the May 2, 1990 Judgment. (Exhibit I, Appendix).
Being unaware of the entry of the December 11, 1990 order,
(Exhibit E) the DeBrys did not file a new notice of appeal.
Eight months later when Fidelity filed its brief in the Court
of Appeals, it (for the first time) claimed that the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction to hear the DeBrys1 appeal on its
merits because there was no notice of appeal filed following entry
of the December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit E). See Appellees1 Brief
filed in the Court of Appeals at Point I.

(Exhibit J, Appendix.)

The Court of Appeals accepted Fidelity's argument and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. DeBry v. Fidelity
National Title Insurance Company, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App.
1992) .

(Exhibit C.)
IX.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CERTIORARI IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS FAILED TO FOLLOW BINDING PRECEDENT OF
THIS COURT AS SET OUT IN THE RECENT CASE OF
GALLARDO V. BOLINDER4

This Court has recently given the Court of Appeals specific
instructions on how to analyse motions:
[I]f the nature of the motion can be ascertained from the substance of the instrument,
we have heretofore held that an improper
caption is not fatal to the motion Gallardo v.
Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1990).
(Emphasis added.)
4

800 P.2d 816 (Utah 1990).
4

The problem in this case is that the Court of Appeals did not
look to the substance of the motion or even its caption; rather,
the Court of Appeals looked only at the calendar to reach its
decision.
If the Court of Appeals had looked at the substance of the
motion, the Court of Appeals would have found:
1.

Nowhere is Rule 52(b) or Rule 59(e) mentioned.

2.

The title of the pleading states: "Plaintiffs1 Objections

and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law."
3.

The

introductory

paragraph

of

the pleading states:

"Plaintiffs submit the following objections and additions to the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. . . . "

See, p.

1, Exhibit D.
4.

The title to the first section of the pleading states:

"General Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact."

See, p. 1,

Exhibit D.
5.

The title to the second section of the pleading states:

"Specific Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact."

See, p. 2,

Exhibit D.
6.

The first sentence of the second section of the pleading

states: "Without waiving the general objection just mentioned, the
plaintiffs submit the following specific objections to the proposed
Findings of Fact."
7.

See, p. 2, Exhibit D.

The second sentence of section two of the pleading

states: "By making these specific objections, the plaintiffs do not

5

intend to resubmit or reargue their opposition to Fidelity's
motion."
8.

See, p. 2, Exhibit D.
Plaintiffs' first objection stated: "Regarding finding

number 1, plaintiffs object to the language 'under construction' on
the third line."
9.

See, p. 3, Exhibit D.

Plaintiffs' second objection stated: "The comments to

number 1 above would apply."
10.

See, p. 3, Exhibit D.

Plaintiffs' third objection stated: "With respect to

finding number 4, plaintiffs object to the characterization by
defendant. . . . "
11.

See, p. 3, Exhibit D.

Plaintiffs' fourth objection stated: "Plaintiffs object

to finding number 5 on the grounds the court made no findings. . ."
See, p. 3, Exhibit D.
12.

Plaintiffs' fifth objection stated:

"Plaintiffs object

to the characterization of the escrow agreement's meaning."

See,

p. 3, Exhibit D.
13.

Plaintiffs' sixth objection stated:

"Plaintiffs object

to the characterization of the letter. . ." See, p. 3, Exhibit D.
14.

The title to the third section of the pleading states:

"Objections to proposed conclusions of law." See, p. 4, Exhibit D.
15.

The first sentence of section 3 states: "The proposed

conclusions of law contain unnecessary and inappropriate restatement of the facts. . . . "
16.

See, page 4, Exhibit D.

The pleading asks for no relief.5

5

The fact plaintiffs' pleading asked for no relief creates a
compelling argument against construing the "objections" as a Rule
52(b) motion since Rule 7(b)(1), U.R.C.P. defines a motion as "an
6

17 • The pleading does not ask the court to alter or amend an
existing Judgment.6
Rather than examining the substance of the pleading (Exhibit
D) or its title, the Court of Appeals looked only to the calendar.
Thus, the Court of Appeals stated:
Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion
filed within ten days of the entry of Judgment
that questions the correctness of the court's
findings and conclusions is properly treated
as a post-judgment motion under either Rules
52 (b) or 59(e).
182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 52.
(Emphasis added.)
The effect of this deference to form over substance is to
magically transform a simple pre-judgment Rule 4-504(2) objection
(which may have been filed late) into a post judgment motion to
amend under Rule 52(b) or 59(e).

Such a result is contrary to the

spirit of Rule 1(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See,
Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988); Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178 (1962).
In summary, the Court of Appeals did not follow Gallardo v.
Bolinder supra, which instructs the Court of Appeals to look to the
substance of DeBrys1 pleading.

Instead, the Court of Appeals

resolved the jurisdictional issue by merely looking at a calendar.

application for an order" which "shall set forth the relief or
order sought". Since DeBrys1 objections ask for no relief, by
definition it is not a motion".
6

The whole purpose of Rule 52(b) is to bring before the Court
a request to modify an existing entered Judgment. Objections filed
pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) have no relation to motions under Rule
52(b).
7

POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE
REVERSES THE LONGSTANDING POLICY OF THIS COURT TO
CONSTRUE PLEADINGS IN FAVOR OF JURISDICTION SO
CASES CAN BE HEARD ON THEIR MERITS
A review of cases decided by this Court in recent years establishes two sound policies.
1.

They are:

Cases should be determined on their merits, e.g. Gallardo

v, Bolinder, supra; Dixon v. Stoddard, supra; Nelson v. Stoker. 669
P.2d 390 (Utah 1983); and
2.

Where possible, pleadings are construed to support juris-

diction and the intent of the filing party.

E.g.. Gallardo v.

Bolinder, supra; Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275
(1960); Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1983).
These policies parallel the holdings of the federal courts.
The Supreme Court has stated in United States v. Hougham, 3 64 U.S.
310 (1960):
The Federal Rules reject the approach that
pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the
outcome and accept the principle that the
purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits. 364 U.S. at 317.
See, Foman v. Davis. 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962).
Relying upon the basic premise that courts should decide cases
on the merits, courts often overlook procedural defects to get to
the merits of the litigants1 dispute.

E.g., American Air Filter

Co. v. Industrial Decking and Roofing Corp., 82 F.R.D. 681 (E.D.
Tenn. 1979); Turner v. McClain, 459 F.Supp. 898 (E.D. Ark. 1978);

8

Pes Isles v. Evans, 225 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1955).

In Pes Isles.

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
The rules have for their primary purpose the
securing of speedy and inexpensive justice in
a uniform and well ordered manner; they were
not adopted to set traps and pitfalls by way
of technicalities for unwary litigants. 225
F.2d at 236.
See, Gonzales v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 385 F.Supp. 140, 145
(P. Puerto Rico 1974).
The court in Turner v. McClain, supra, states:
In general, the rules and statutes should be
interpreted to produce decisions disposing of
claims on their merits. Substantial justice
is the end purpose of the process. . . 4 5 9
F.Supp. at 902.
In Vreeken v. Pavis. 718 F.2d 343 (10 Cir. 1983) the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld

a trial court order, which

construed a pleading denominated as a Rule 60(b) motion to be a
Rule 59 motion, so as to allow an appeal to proceed on its merits.
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that Rule l7 allows the
court to proceed to the merits of an appeal where strict compliance
with the rules has not occurred.

Pixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879

(Utah 1988).
This Court has previously construed a pleading to be other
than what is stated in its caption to support appellate jurisdiction, Gallardo v. Bolinder, supra; Nelson v. Stoker, supra;
Howard v. Howard, supra; but never the converse.

7

In fact, in

Rule 1, U.R.C.P. provides in part: "These rules shall govern
the procedure. . . in all actions, suits and proceedings of a civil
nature. . . They shall be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."
9

Gallardo v. Bolinder, supra, this court summarily reversed a ruling
of the Court of Appeals which refused to consider the intent of the
parties which supported a conclusion that the appeal had been
timely filed.

Similar action is warranted in this case.
POINT III

THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ENCOURAGES
BLATANT DISREGARD OF PROCEDURAL RULES
As stated in Point II, supra, the DeBrys filed objections to
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [pursuant to Rule
4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.] Arguably,
the DeBrys1 "objections" were filed late.

(See, Facts Section,

supra.) However, if the DeBrys1 objections were in fact late, the
DeBrys were led into the trap of filing late because of Fidelity's
numerous procedural violations.
Seven months after the Notice of Appeal was filed in this
case, Fidelity, with blatant disregard of the applicable procedural
rules, submitted an order to Judge Brian which characterized the
DeBrys1 "Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law" as a Rule 52(b) motion.

(See Exhibit E).

In

violation of procedural rules, Judge Brian signed the order. Being
unaware such an order had been signed, the DeBrys did not file a
new Notice of Appeal. In a pronounced departure from prior rulings
of this court,8 the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court
could properly construe objections filed under Rule 4-504, Utah

See argument at Point II., supra.
10

Code of Judicial Administration, as a Rule 52(b) motion.

DeBry v.

Fidelity, supra.
The net result of this ruling is to reward Fidelity for its
ingenious string of procedural rules violations.

The course of

Fidelity's rules violations were as follows:
1.

Violation of Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. provides in part:
The trial court need not enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b).
Fidelity violated this rule as follows:
Following summary judgment, Fidelity submitted findings of
fact and conclusions of law to support the summary judgment. This
was a violation of Rule 52(a) because findings and conclusions are
not proper or necessary to support summary judgment.

Mountain

States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright, & Miles, 681
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).

This uncalled for submission triggered

plaintiff to file objections to the findings, conclusions and order
pursuant to Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration. (Ex. D.)
2.

Violations of Rule 4-504(2) Utah Code of Judicial
Administration and Rule 6 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 4-504(2) provides:
Copies of the proposed findings,judgments, and
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel
before being presented to the court for
signature unless the court otherwise orders.
Notice of objections shall be submitted to the
court and counsel within five days after
service.

11

Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defines the
method of calculating the time allowed to carry out requirements of
the Rules.9
Fidelity violated these rules as follows:

The proposed

findings, conclusions and judgment were hand delivered to plaintiff
April 24, 1990 (Exhibit E) . They were mailed to all other counsel
April 25, 1990 (Exhibit F).

The mailing certificate (Exhibit F)

was attached to the proposed findings (Exhibit E) and delivered to
the DeBrys. This created some confusion as to when objections were
due.

Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), using Rule 6 time computations,

the last day on which counsel could file objections to the form of
the proposed judgment was May 7, 1992.10

Fidelity submitted the

order for signature 5 days early in violation of Rule 4-504(2) and
Rule 6.

The judge signed the order (Exhibit G) 5 days prior to

expiration of the time allowed for objections.
Plaintiffs1 counsel prepared and signed objections to the
findings of fact and conclusions of law on May 4, 1990 and they

9

Rule 4-504 allows 5 days to object to the form of a proposed
order. In calculating the 5 days, Rule 6(a) U.R.C.P. provides you
do not count Saturdays, Sundays or holidays. Where copies of a
proposed order are served by mail, as they were in this case, (see
Exhibit F, appendix), Rule 6(e) adds 3 more days. Where the last
filing day is a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, Rule 6(a) extends the
last day for filing to the next business day.
10

Fidelity mailed the judgment to counsel on April 25, 1990
(Exhibit E). Five days under Rule 6(a) would make objections due
on Wednesday, May 2, 1990(the day Judge Brian actually signed the
order, see Exhibit G) . However, Rule 6(e) adds three days for mail
service which allows for objections until Saturday, May 5, 1990.
Since Rule 6(a) moves the due date from a Saturday to the following
Monday, the last day for objections would have been May 7, 1990,
the date DeBrys filed their objections.
12

were filed on Monday, May 7, 1990.

(Exhibit D.)

Even though the

DeBrys' objections were technically filed late because Fidelity
sent the DeBrys1 copy by hand delivery, if Fidelity had not
violated procedural rules and submitted the order early, the
DeBrys1 objections would have been filed prior to signing of the
judgment and no question would have arisen as to whether the
DeBrys1 objections were a Rule 52(b) motion.

The confusion as to

the form of the DeBrys1 objections was caused by Fidelity's rules
violations in submitting the order early for signature.
3.

Violation of Rule
Administration.

4-504(4)

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Rule 4-504(4) provides:
Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon the opposing party
and proof of such service shall be filed with
the court.
All judgments, orders, and
decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be
transmitted after signature by the judge,
including other correspondence requiring a
reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed
envelopes and pre-paid postage.
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows:
No notice of entry of judgment was sent to anyone by Fidelity.
When the DeBrys objections under Rule 4-504(2) were filed on May 7,
1990, counsel was unaware of the May 2, signing of the judgment.
When it was discovered that the judgment had been filed May 2,
1990, counsel assumed the Rule 4-504(2) objections were moot11 and
filed a notice of appeal.

n

A pleading filed out of time has no force or effect.
Rivera v. M/T Fossarina, 840 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1988).
13

See,

4.

Violation of Rule 4-501(1) (b) of the Code of Judicial
Administration.

Rule 4-501(1)(b) provides:
The responding party shall file and serve upon
all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the
motion, and all supporting documentation. If
the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to a motion within ten days
after service of the motion, the moving party
may notify the clerk to submit the matter to
the court for decision as provided in paragraph (1)(d) of this rule.
Fidelity violated this rule as follows:
If in fact the DeBrys1 objections (Exhibit D) were a Rule
52(b) motion which was opposed by Fidelity, Rule
requires a response in opposition within ten days.
responded.

4-501(1)(b)

Fidelity never

When Fidelity failed to file a written response, it

waived any right to submit the motion for decision.

Violation of

this rule denied the DeBrys notice that Fidelity thought a Rule
52(b) motion was pending or that Fidelity opposed such a motion.
5.
Rule

Violation of Rule 4-501(1)(d).
4-501(1)(d), Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Administration

provides:
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to
file a reply memorandum, either party may
notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the
court for decision. The notification shall be
in the form of a separate written pleading and
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision."
The notification shall contain a certificate
of mailing to all parties. If neither party
files a notice, the motion will not be
submitted for decision.
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows:
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Assuming, arguendo, that a Rule 52(b) motion was pending, if
Fidelity wanted a ruling, Rule 4-501(1)(d) requires a notice to
submit for decision.

Even if we assume Fidelity's violation of

Rule 4-501(1)(b) did not preclude Fidelity from submitting the
motion for decision, Fidelity never complied with Rule 4-501(1)(d)
and thereby denied notice to the DeBrys that Fidelity thought a
Rule 52(b) motion was pending or under consideration.

The rule

provides that if a notice to submit is not filed, then "the motion
will not be submitted for decision." Counsel has a right to assume
that no ruling will be made or order entered unless submitted for
decision pursuant to rule 4-501(1)(d).
A party who does not submit an opposition memorandum cannot
submit the motion for decision.12

Fidelity had no right to submit

the DeBrys1 Rule 4-504 objections for decision as a Rule 52(b)
motion because Fidelity never filed an opposing memorandum pursuant
to rule 4-501(1)(b).
However, even if we assume Fidelity had a right to submit the
matter

for decision, Fidelity's failure to comply with Rule

4-501(1)(d) by submitting a "Notice to Submit for Decision" with a
copy served on counsel for the DeBrys, denied notice to DeBrys that
12

Rule 4-501(1)(b) provides that if no opposition memorandum is
filed the moving party may submit the matter for decision. No
provision is made for submission by the responding party where no
opposition memorandum has been filed.
Rule 4-501(1)(d), which
allows either party to submit the motion for decision, comes into
play only following filing of a reply memorandum.
A reply
memorandum is filed under Rule 4-501(1) (c) only when the responding
party has filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion under Rule
4-501(1)(b). Thus, a party who files no opposition to a pending
motion has no right under Rule 4-501(1) to submit a pending motion
for decision.
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Fidelity: (1) considered the DeBrys1 objections to be a Rule 52(b)
motion; and (2) that Fidelity was asking the court to rule on the
supposed pending motion.
6.

Violations of Rule 4-504(1).

Rule 4-504(1) provides:
In all rulings by a court, counsel for the
party or parties obtaining the ruling shall
within fifteen days, or within a shorter time
as the court may direct, file with the court a
proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling.
Fidelity violated this rule as follows:
Rule 4-504(1) allows submission of a proposed order only after a
ruling of the court. Fidelity violated this rule when it submitted
the December 11, 1990 order for signature.

There had been no

ruling from the court and no request for a ruling had been filed.
The previous rules violations had denied notice to the DeBrys that
Fidelity thought there was an unresolved motion. If the DeBrys had
been put on such notice, they would have been aware that Fidelity
thought there was a Rule 52(b) motion underway and upon conclusion
of the resolution process under Rules 4-501 and 4-504, the DeBrys
could have then filed a timely notice of appeal.
7.

Additional Violation of Rule 4-504(4).

In addition to the violation of Rule 4-504(4) set forth in
paragraph

3 above, Fidelity

again violated

Rule

4-504(4)

as

follows:
Having obtained a signature on the December 11, 1990 order in
violation of procedural rules as set forth above, Fidelity again
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violated rule 4-504(4) by not notifying the DeBrys of entry of the
order.

This denied to the DeBrys a notice which would have

triggered the duty to file a new notice of appeal, which would have
then avoided dismissal of the appeal.
Fidelity's

rules violations

denied

to the

DeBrys

three

specific notices which would have alerted the DeBrys that a problem
existed regarding the Rule 4-504 objections which the DeBrys had
thought were mooted by signing of the judgment from which the
DeBrys appealed in this case. These additional notices would have
precluded entry of the December 11 order without the DeBrys1
knowledge and the DeBrys1 appeal rights could have been timely
protected so that a decision on the merits could have been rendered
in this case.
It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to enter orders
in violation of procedural rules. Schleininq v. Estate of Morris,
431 P.2d 464 (Colo. 1967) (en banc).

Procedural rules are enacted

to provide a pattern of regularity in the practice of law which can
be relied upon by litigants and their counsel. Drury v. Lunceford,
18 Utah 2d 74, 76, 415 P.2d 662 (1966).
POINT IV
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS REQUIRE THIS COURT TO EXAMINE
THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE
The holding of the Court of Appeals in this case raises
questions as to whether the DeBrys were denied due process of law.
In Llovd v. Third Judicial District Court. 27 Utah 2d 322, 495
P.2d 1262 (1970), the Supreme Court defined due process of law as:
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[A] course of legal proceedings according to
those rules and principles which have been
established in our systems of jurisprudence
for the enforcement and protection of private
rights. 27 Utah 2d at 324.
Due process of law requires that a litigant be given his day
in court in compliance with established procedural rules.

See,

Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1894); Llovd v. Third Judicial
District Court, supra; Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d
662 (1966); Mavland v. State, 568 P.2d 897 (Wyo. 1977).
A party has a right to rely on the parties to the litigation
following procedural rules. Drury v. Luncefordf 18 Utah 2d at 76.
In Drury this court stated that procedural rules:
[A]re to be liberally construed to effectuate
justice, nevertheless, they were designed to
provide a pattern of regularity of procedure
which the parties and the courts could follow
and rely upon. Id. (Emphasis added.)
Procedural rules cannot be changed at the whim of the court or
a party.

Mayland v. State, supra.

The disregard of procedural

rules by a trial court cannot be countenanced.

Mesa v. Washington

State Department of Social and Health Services, 683 F.2d 314 (9th
Cir. 1982). Appellate courts routinely reverse trial court rulings
where procedural rules have been ignored or violated. E.g., Conner
v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., 56 N.C. App. 1, 286 S.E.2d 810 (1982)
review den. 294 S.E.2d 206 (1982); Armstrong v. Lake, 447 N.E.2d
1153, 1154 (Ind. App. 1983); State v. Turner, 10 Ohio App.3d 328,
462 N.E.2d 1250 (1983); Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain, 442 P.2d
187 (Colo. 1968); Schleining v. Estate of Morris, 431 P.2d 464
(Colo. 1967) (en banc); Thomas v. Children's Hospital Ass'n, 535
18

P.2d 249 (Colo. App. 1975); Motz v. Jammaron, 676 P.2d 1211 (Colo.
App. 1983).
A party has a right to rely on application of the Rules as
written and the court has a duty to enforce the rules as written.
E.g. , Drury v. Lunceford, supra; Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain.
supra; Motz v. Jammaron, supra; Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance
Co., supra.

Due process of law requires following the regular

course of proceedings.

Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901).

In addition to the Due Process consideration, the DeBrys have
a constitutional right to have the district court decision reviewed
on its merits. Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 5. The right to an appeal
is a valuable constitutional right. Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah
52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947).

Utah's constitution provides:

The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by
this constitution or by statute, and power to
issue all extraordinary writs. The district
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all
other courts, both original and appellate,
shall be provided by statute.
Except for
matters filed originally with the Supreme
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal
of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction
over the cause. Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 5.
In good faith, the DeBrys1 followed the procedural steps
necessary to appeal the summary judgment issued by the district
court.

As shown in Point III, supra, Fidelity's procedural

violations created a procedural trap wherein the Court of Appeals
ultimately refused to hear the DeBrys' appeal on its merits.
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The effect of the ruling of the Court of Appeals, as argued
herein, is to deny the DeBrys their Constitutional Right to have
their appeal heard on its merits, in violation of Art. VIII, § 5 of
the Utah Constition and, for that reason, the ruling of the Court
of Appeals should be reversed.
X.
CONCLUSION
Fidelity's numerous procedural omissions and violations set in
motion a series of events which created a confused procedural
setting.

The confusion generated by Fidelity's acts resulted in

dismissal of the appeal in this case on a procedural technicality.
Rule 46(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides
for granting a Writ of Certiorari "when a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of state or federal law in a way
that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court."

The

decision of the Court of Appeals in this case conflicts with
Supreme Court decisions as argued herein. This court should grant
certiorari to correct the error of the Court of Appeals.
DATED this

^<,J>

day of June, 1992.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT A

459

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of
any cause.
1984

Sec. 4.

(Rule-making power of Supreme Court
— Judges pro tempore — Regulation
of practice of law.]
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure
and evidence to be used in the courts of the state and
shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of
two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law.
1984
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other
courts — Right of appeal.!
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in
all matters except as limited by this constitution or
by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs.
The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided
by statute. Except for matters filed originally with
the Supreme Court, there shall be in all eases an
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction
to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
1984

S e c . 6.

[Number of j u d g e s of district court and
other courts — Divisions.]
The number of judges of the district court and of
other courts of record established by the Legislature
shall be provided by statute. No change in the number of judges shall have the effect of removing a judge
from office during a judge's term of office. Geographic
divisions for all courts of record except the Supreme
Court may be provided by statute. N o change in divisions shall have the effect of removing a judge from
office during a judge's term of office.
1984
S e c . 7. [ Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f j u s t i c e s a n d j u d g e s . ]
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years
old, United States citizens, Utah residents for five
years preceding selection, and admitted to practice
law in Utah. Judges of other courts of record shall be
at least 25 years old, United States citizens, Utah
residents for three years preceding selection, and admitted to practice law in Utah. If geographic divisions are provided for any court, judges of that court
shall reside in the geographic division for which they
are selected.
1984

Sec. 8.

[Vacancies — Nominating
commissions
— Senate approval.]
When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the
governor shall fill the vacancy by appointment from a
list of at least three nominees certified to the governor by the Judicial Nominating Commission having
authority over the vacancy. The governor shall fill
the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of
nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy
within the time prescribed, the chief justice of the
Supreme Court shall within 20 days make the appointment from the list of nominees. The Legislature
by statute shall provide for the nominating commissions' composition and procedures. No member of the

Art. VIII, § 13

Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the
Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial Nominating Commission. The Senate shall consider and
render a decision on each judicial appointment within
30 days of the date of appointment. If necessary, the
Senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session
for the purpose of considering judicial appointments.
The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a
majority of all members of the Senate. If the Senate
fails to approve the appointment, the office shall be
considered vacant and a new nominating process
shall commence. Selection of judges shall be based
solely upon consideration of fitness for office without
regard to any partisan political considerations. 1984
Sec. 9. [Judicial retention elections.]
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject
to an unopposed retention election at the first general
election held more than three years after appointment. Following initial voter approval, each Supreme
Court justice every tenth year, and each judge of
other courts of record every sixth year, shall be subject to an unopposed retention election at the corresponding general election. Judicial retention elections shall be held on a nonpartisan ballot in a manner provided by statute. If geographic divisions are
provided for any court of record, the judges of those
courts shall stand for retention election only in the
geographic division to which they are selected.
1984
Sec. 10. [Restrictions on justices and judges.)
Supreme court justices, district court judges, and
judges of all other courts of record while holding office
may not practice law, hold any elective nonjudicial
public office, or hold office in a political party.
1984
Sec. 11. [Judges of courts not of record.]
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a
manner, for a term, and with qualifications provided
by statute. However, no qualification may be imposed
which requires judges of courts not of record to be
admitted to practice law. The number of judges of
courts not of record shall be provided by statute. 1984
Sec. 12. [Judicial Council — Chief justice as administrative officer.]
A Judicial Council is established, which shall adopt
rules for the administration of the courts of the state.
The Judicial Council shall consist of the chief justice
of the Supreme Court, as presiding officer, and such
other justices, judges, and other persons as provided
by statute. There shall be at least one representative
on the Judicial Council from each court established
by the constitution or by statute. The chief justice of
the Supreme Court shall be the chief administrative
officer for the courts and shall implement the rules
adopted by the Judicial Council.
1984
Sec. 13. [Judicial Conduct
Commission.}
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established
which shall investigate and conduct confidential
hearings regarding complaints against any justice or
judge. Following its investigations and hearings, the
Judicial Conduct Commission may order the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary
retirement of any justice or judge for the following:
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct
in office;
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a
felony under state or federal law;
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties;
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Section
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.
78-2-2.
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
78-2-3.
Repealed.
78-2-4.
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges
pro tempore, and practice of law.
78-2-5.
Repealed.
78-2-6.
Appellate court administrator.
78-2-7.
Repealed.
78-2-7.5.
Service of sheriff to court.
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.

78-2-4

(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief jus(v) the state engineer;
tice and associate chief justice — Se(f) final orders and decrees of the district court
lection and functions.
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices.
agencies under Subsection (e);
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be ap(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of
pointed initially to serve until the first general elecrecord holding a statute of the United States or
tion held more than three years after the effective
this state unconstitutional on its face under the
date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office
Constitution of the United States or the Utah
of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years and
Constitution;
commences on the first Monday in January following
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of
the date of election. A justice whose term expires may
record involving a charge of a first degree or capiserve upon request of the Judicial Council until a
tal felony;
successor is appointed and qualified.
(i) appeals from the district court involving a
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
chief justice from among the members of the court by
a majority vote of all justices. The term of the office of
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court
chief justice is four years. The chief justice may serve
of record over which the Court of Appeals does
successive terms. The chief justice may resign from
not have original appellate jurisdiction.
the office of chief justice without resigning from the
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
Supreme Court. The chief justice may be removed of Appeals any of the matters over which the Sufrom the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, exjustices of the Supreme Court.
cept:
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of
within 30 days of a vacancy in that office, the assoan interlocutory order of a court of record involvciate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a
ing a charge of a capital felony;
chief justice is elected under this section. If the asso(b) election and voting contests;
ciate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act as
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
justice until a chief justice is elected under this sec(e) general water adjudication;
tion.
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a)
member of the Supreme Court, the chief justice has
through (0.
duties as provided by law.
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
(6) There is created the office of associate chief jus- granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
tice. The term of office of the associate chief justice is for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
two years. The associate chief justice may serve in the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
that office no more than two successive terms. The to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
associate chief justice shall be elected by a majority
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the revote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If agency adjudicative proceedings.
1989
the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
i9se
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 78-2-3. Repealed.
justice. The chief justice may delegate responsibilities
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges
to the associate chiefjustice as consistent with law.
pro tempore, and practice of law.
1990
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce7
&2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.
1971,1981 dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote
answer questions of state law certified by a court of of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature.
&e United States.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
*sue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize
dl writs and process necessary to carry into effect its retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdic- perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall
ion.
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
(
3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
Qcluding jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) a iudmwAnt nf tk<> r™~*- ~e A
1-

EXHIBIT B

OPERATION OF THE COURTS
Subdivisions (5) through (7) as Subdivisions
(5)(C) and (D) and (6); substituted "circuit" for
"court" in Subdivision (5)(C); substituted "presiding judge" for "court" in two places m Subdivision (5)(D); substituted "March 1st" for "February 28th" in Subdivision (6); added Subdivision (7); and made stylistic changes throughout.
The 1990 amendment, in Subdivision (1)
added "or if the statement is made on behalf of
a business or corporation, a statement that the
business or corporation" to the introductory
language of paragraph (C) and made stylistic
changes; rewrote Subdivision (2) to delete Ianguage relating to appraisals and inserted "prepared by a certified public accountant"; redesignated former Subdivision (2)(C) as present
Subdivision (3), added present Subdivision (4),

Rule 4-501

and renumbered the remaining subdivisions
accordingly, making appropriate reference
changes throughout; in present Subdivision
(3), deleted "audited" before "financial statement" and substituted "surety" for "company"
in the first sentence and substituted "the
value" for "a ratio of bond dollars to letter of
credit dollars" in the second sentence; in
present Subdivision (5), substituted "current
assets" for "real assets" in two places; and rewrote present Subdivision (6) to delete a table
setting out the ratio of bond dollars outstanding to net worth value,
The 1992 amendment substituted "Commercial" for "qualifications o f in the rule heading,
inserted "re-qualification and disqualification"
and "commercial" in the Intent section, and
substantially rewrote the rule.

Rule 4-408, Locations of trial courts of record.
Intent:
To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy;
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City.
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any
subject matter jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this
rule.
(Added effective January 1, 1992.)

ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de967
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partment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
968
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has
been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after
that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a
detailed description is impracticable.
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of

the proposed order" following "supporting documentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made related stylistic changes and inserted "principal"
in Subdivision (3)(b).
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Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments,
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small
claims.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity
with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court
and counsel within five days after service.
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement
and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or
decree is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall contain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the
social security number of the judgment debtor if known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is
based.
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was
made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint
a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation.
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(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court,
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to writing.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment inserted "civil proceedings in" and "except small claims" under "Applicability" and
made minor stylistic changes in the Statement
of the Rule.

The 1991 amendment added the final sentence to the Intent paragraph, deleted "and not
of record" following "courts of record" in the
Applicability paragraph, and added Subdivision (10).

Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits.
Intent:
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for affidavits in support
of attorneys' fees.
Applicability:
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in the trial courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' fees must be filed with
the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of
the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute
the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage
for which attorneys' fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the
fees for comparable legal services.
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than
attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed.
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is
expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred
in pursuit of collection:
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT
SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING
SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL
BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT."
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be awarded except as they
conform to the provisions of this rule and to state statute and case law.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment inserted "be filed with the court and" in
Subdivision (1), deleted the former Subdivision
(2), requiring descriptions of fee arrangements
other than hourly rates, added the designation

(2) to the former last sentence of Subdivision
(1), and in Subdivision (4) inserted the subdivision designation and the phrase beginning
"and" at the end.
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Rule 47

TITLE VII.
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of
Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.

Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by the Supreme Court.

Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; filing;
parties.
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 48, pay the certiorari docketing
fee and file ten copies of a petition which shall comply in all respects with
Rule 49. The case then will be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the
petitioner shall serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party
separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to
notify all parties in the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket
number of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21.
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases.
(c) Cross-petition of respondent. Counsel for a respondent wishing to file
a cross-petition shall, within the time provided by Rule 48(d), pay the certio485
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rari docketing fee and file ten copies of a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari
which shall comply in all respects with Rule 49. The cross-petition will then
be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the cross-petitioner shall serve
four copies of the cross-petition on counsel for each party separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the cross-petitioner to notify all
parties in the case of the date of the filing and of the certiorari docket number
of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. A crosspetition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined with any other filing; the
clerk shall not accept any filing so joined.
(d) Parties. All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall be
deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of
the parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition. A copy of
such notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party
noted as no longer interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, with
service on the other parties, that the party has an interest in the petition.
(e) Motion for certification and transmission of record. A party intending to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petition or at any
time prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file a motion
for an order to have the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the trial
court certify the record, or any part of it, and provide for its transmission to
the Supreme Court. Motions to certify the record prior to action on the petition by the Supreme Court should rarely be made, only when the record is
essential to the Supreme Court's proper understanding of the petition or the
brief in opposition and such understanding cannot be derived from the contents of the petition or the brief in opposition, including the appendix. If a
motion is appropriate, it shall be made to the Supreme Court after the filing of
a petition but prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition. In the case
of a stay of execution of a judgment of the Court of Appeals, such a motion
may be made before the filing of the petition. Thereafter, the Clerk of the
Supreme Court or any party to the case may request that additional parts of
the record be certified and transmitted to the Supreme Court. Copies of all
motions for certification and transmission shall be sent to the parties to the
proceeding. All motions and orders shall comply with and be subject to the
requirements of Rule 23.

Rule 48. Time for petitioning.
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the
decision by the Court of Appeals.
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a
writ of certiorari which is jurisdictional^ out of time.
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of
Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If, however, a
petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the
petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial
of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the rehearing.
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Rule 49

(d) Time for cross-petition.
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed:
(A) within the time provided in subdivisions (a) and (c) of this rule;
or
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari.
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to paragraph (d)(1)(B) of
this rule will not be granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certiorari of another party to the case is granted.
(e) Extension of time. The Supreme Court, upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a crosspetition for a writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 days after
the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule,
whichever is applicable. Any such motion which is filed before expiration of
the prescribed time may be ex parte, unless the Supreme Court otherwise
requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the
prescribed time shall be given to the other parties. No extension shall exceed
30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order
granting the motion, whichever occurs later.

Rule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari.
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order
indicated:
( D A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Supreme Court contains the names of all parties.
(2) A table of contents with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities
cited, with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited.
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumentative or repetitious. General conclusions, such as "the decision of the Court
of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. The
statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in
the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme
Court.
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions
issued by the Court of Appeals.
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is invoked, showing:
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of
time within which to petition for certiorari;
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; and
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(D) the statutory provision believed to confer on the Supreme
Court jurisdiction to review the decision in question by a writ of
certiorari.
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and
regulations that the case involves, setting them out verbatim and giving
the appropriate citation. If the controlling provisions involved are
lengthy, their citation alone will suffice at this point and their pertinent
text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in subparagraph (10) of
this paragraph.
(8) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its disposition in
the lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to
the issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record and to
the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise argument explaining the special and important reasons as provided in Rule 46
for the issuance of the writ.
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order:
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting
opinions, and all orders, including any order on rehearing, delivered
by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B) copies of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law,
orders, judgments, or decrees that were rendered in the case or in
companion cases by the Court of Appeals and by other courts or by
administrative agencies and that are relevant to the questions presented. Each document shall include the caption showing the name of
the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the case, and the
date of its entry; and
(C) any other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that are
relevant to the questions presented but were not entered in the case
that is the subject of the petition.
If the material that is required by subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this paragraph is voluminous, such may, if more convenient, be separately presented.
(b) Form of petition. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply with
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27. The cover of the petition shall be
white. The clerk shall examine all petitions before filing, and if a petition is
not prepared in accordance with Rule 27 and this paragraph, it will not be
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared.
(c) No separate brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in subparagraph (a)(9) of this rule. No separate brief in support of a petition for a writ of
certiorari will be received, and the clerk will refuse to file any petition for a
writ of certiorari to which is annexed or appended any supporting brief.
(d) Page limitation. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as
possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by subparagraph (a)(7) of
this rule, and the appendix.
(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity. The failure of a petitioner
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready
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Rule 50

and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a
sufficient reason for denying the petition.

Rule 50, Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus
curiae.
(a) Brief in opposition. The respondent shall have 30 days after service of
a petition in which to file ten copies of an opposing brief, disclosing any matter
or ground why the case should not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Such
brief shall comply with the requirements of Rule 49, as applicable, and comply
with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27. The cover of the brief shall be
orange. The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not
prepared in accordance with Rule 27 and with the proper cover, it will not be
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. Four copies of the brief
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately
represented.
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 49(a)(7), and
the appendix.
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to grant the writ of certiorari may be included in the
brief in opposition.
(d) Distribution of filings. Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file,
the petition and the brief, if any, will be distributed by the clerk for consideration. However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed, distribution of both it and the petition for a writ of certiorari will be delayed until
the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the expiration of the
time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file.
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the
brief in opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under
paragraph (d) of this rule will not be delayed pending the filing of any such
brief. Such brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages.
Such brief shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27. The
cover of the brief shall be yellow. The clerk shall examine all briefs before
filing, and if a brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule 27 and with the
proper cover, it will not be filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared.
Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four copies shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately represented.
(f) Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only if
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the Supreme Court
granted on motion, or at the request of the Supreme Court. A motion for leave
shall identify the interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a
brief of an amicus curiae is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent,
an amicus curiae shall file its brief within the time allowed the party whose
position it will support, unless the Supreme Court for cause shown shall grant
leave for later filing, in which event it shall specify within what period an
opposing party may answer. Such brief shall comply with the requirements of
Rule 49, as applicable, and comply with the form of briefs as specified in Rule
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27. The cover of the brief shall be green. The brief may not exceed 20 pages,
excluding the subject index, the table of authorities, any verbatim quotations
required by Rule 49(a)(7), and the appendix. Ten copies of the brief shall be
filed, and four copies shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for
each party separately represented.

Rule 51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.
(a) Order after consideration. After consideration of the documents distributed pursuant to Rule 50, the Supreme Court will enter an order denying
the petition or granting the petition in whole or in part. The order shall be
decided summarily, shall be without oral argument, and shall not constitute a
decision on the merits.
(b) Grant of petition. Whenever an order granting a petition for a writ of
certiorari is entered, the Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith shall notify
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and counsel of record. The case then will
stand for briefing and oral argument. If the record has not previously been
filed, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall request the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals to certify it and transmit it to the Supreme Court. A formal writ shall
not issue unless specially directed.
(c) Denial of petition. Whenever a petition for a writ of certiorari is denied, an order to that effect will be entered, and the Clerk of the Supreme
Court forthwith will notify the Court of Appeals and counsel of record.
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RULE

RULE

71 A. Process in behalf of and against persons
not parties.
7IB. Proceedings where parties not summoned.

78 to 80. [Repealed.]

PART IX. APPEALS.

72 through 76. [Repealed.]

PART XL GENERAL PROVISIONS.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Applicability of rules in general.
Jurisdiction and venue unaffected.
[Repealed.]
Forms.
Title.

PART X. DISTRICT COURTS AND CLERKS.

Noncompliance.
Noncompliance with ]
when some inadvertent
neglect, or mistake has o
is required for substant
Holton v. Holton, 121 U
(1952).
Cited in Howard v. He

APPENDIX OF FORMS.

77. District courts and clerks.

INDEX TO RULES.

PART L
SCOPE OF RULES — ONE FORM OF ACTION.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 2C
§§ 85, 86.

Rule 2. One f
There shall be

Rule 1. General provisions.
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the Supreme
Court, the district courts, the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state
of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as
governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in
the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when
the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which
event the former procedure applies.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rules 1 and 86(a), F.R.C.P.,
except that it has been adapted to procedure of
this state.
Cross-References. — Children's cases
deemed civil proceedings, § 78-3a-44.
Jurisdiction and venue of courts unaffected
by rules, Rule 82.

Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, district
courts, circuit courts, and justice courts, Chapters 2, 2a, 3, 4, 5 of Title 78.
Supreme Court's rulemaking power, § 78-24.
United States, execution of process on land
acquired by, §§ 63-8-1, 63-8-3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
apply to a proceeding before an administrative
body seeking to regulate activities burdened
with a public interest. Entre Nous Club v.
Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955).
Federal rules.
Since these rules were fashioned after the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is proper to
examine decisions under the federal rules to
determine the meanings thereof. Winegar v.
Slim Olson, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P.2d 205
(1953) (construing Rule 41).

ANALYSIS

Applicability.
—Administrative body.
Federal rules.
Noncompliance.
Cited.
Applicability.
—Administrative body.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not

4

Compiler's Notes. to Rule 2. F.R.C.P.
Cross-References.
23.
Consolidation of act:
trial, Rule 42(a).

AN

Forms of action.
—Common-law nam<
—Defective answer.
Law and equity.
—Acceleration claus
—Equitable defense*
—Relief granted.
Cited.
Forms of action.
—Common-law na
The common-law
ous actions or rem
practical force or efi
is called upon to giv
ute. O'Neill v. San
Utah 475, 114 P.
—Defective answ
The abolition of
ings did not cure t
plaintiff could not t
1 Utah 28 (1876).
Law and equity.
Pursuant to thi
may be applied in
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at
Law § 6; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to
352.
C.J.S. — 7 C J.S. Attorney and Client § 15;
71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413.
A.L.R. — Construction of phrase "usual

place of abode," or similar terms referring to
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes
relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112.
Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client «=>
90; Pleading *=> 331 to 338.

Rule 6. Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g),
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending
before it.
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some
other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period.
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instructions. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985).
Written instructions.
—Failure to tender.
Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he could not
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350,
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas,
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v.
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J.
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480

P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr.
Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973);
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v.
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v.
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v.
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v.
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods.
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. &
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial
§ 1077 et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448.
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of
instructions in civil case as affected by the
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d
501.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 10.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon,
18 A.L.R.3d 88.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 170.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case

stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
Construction of statutes or rules making
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform approved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
in tort is given in products liability case, 52
A.L.R.3d 101.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construction and effect of provision in Rule 51, and similar state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 182 to 296.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
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considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Amendment.
—Motion.
Conformance with original findings.
New trial.
Notice of appeal.

Time.
Tolling of appeal period.
When made.
—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards.
Criminal cases.
Criminal contempt.
Effect.
—Preclusion of summary judgment.
—Relation to pleadings.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judicial review.
—Equity cases.
—Standard of review.
Conclusions of law.
Criminal cases.
Criminal trials.
Findings of facts by jury.
Intent.
Juvenile proceedings.
Purpose of rule.
Stipulations.
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eree's order to participate in appeal secured by
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914.
Power of successor or substituted master or
J J ••
*
J
.
r
referee to render decision or enter judgment on
testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d
1079
Referee's failure to file report within time

specified by statute, court order, or stipulation
as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889.
What a r e
"exceptional conditions" justifying
f
reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b),
I A L R Fed 922
K e y N u m b e r s . _ E q u i t v « , 3 9 3 t o 395> 4 0 1 j
404 to 406; Reference «=> 3 et seq., 35 to 77, 99
et seq.

PART VII.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
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whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3)
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the
appellate court and costs in original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See,
now, Rule 34(d), UtahRApp.P.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 54, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Continuances, discretion to require payment of costs, Rule 40(b).
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs,
§ 49-6-301.
State, payment of costs awarded against,
§ 78-27-13.
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule
62(h).
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Absence of express determination.
Amendment of pleadings.
Appeal as of right.
Certification not determinative.
Costs.
—In general.
—Challenge of award.
—Depositions.
—Discretionary.
—Expenses of preparation for action.
—Failure to object.
—Liability of state.
—Service on adverse party.
—Statutory limits.
—Untimely filing of memorandum.
—When not demanded.
Default judgments.
Effect of partial final judgment.
Final order.
—Appealability.
—Attorney's fee award.

—Claims for relief.
—Complete disposal of claim or party.
—Review of finality.
—Separate claim.
Inconsistent oral statements.
Interest on judgment.
Judgment based on unpleaded theory.
Judgment in favor of nonparty.
Motion to reconsider.
Pleading in the alternative.
Presumption of finality.
Real party in interest.
Relief not demanded in pleadings.
Specific performance request.
Unpleaded issue tried by consent.
Cited.
Absence of express determination.
In action based on alleged breach of loan
agreement, where trial court improperly dismissed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judgment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

* -nan

C . ' *Oourt

ooOoo
Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry,

ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.

Case No. 910329-CA

Fidelity National Title Ins.,
Defendant and Appellee.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's
Petition for Rehearing, filed April 15, 1992,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.

Dated this

vu

FOR THE COURT:

Mary T / Noonan
Clerk^bf t h e Court

'

day of April, 1992

CODE • co
Provo. Utah

DeBry v. Fidelity N ional Title Ins. Co.
182 Utah

lv. Rep. 31
~
51
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Cite as
Administration,2 Fidelity submitted the prop182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51
osed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment to the trial court on May 2, 1990.
IN T H E
That same day, the trial court signed and the
U T A H C O U R T OF A P P E A L S
clerk of the court entered the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment.
Robert J. DeBRY and Joan DeBry,
On May 7, 1990, five days after entry of
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
judgment, DeBrys filed a document entitled
v.
'Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
INSURANCE CO.,
Law." In the document, DeBrys objected to
Defendant and Appellee.
various findings of fact and conclusions of law
and argued that specific additional findings of
No. 910329-CA
fact and conclusions of law should be made by
FILED: March 18,1992
the trial court. On May 22, 1990, DeBrys filed
a notice of appeal 'from the order ... granting
Third District, Salt Lake County
summary judgment ... entered ... on May 2,
Honorable Pat B. Brian
1990."
On November 16, 1990, Fidelity mailed to
ATTORNEYS:
DeBrys' counsel a copy of a proposed order
Edward T. Wells, Salt Lake City, for
denying DeBrys' objections and additions to
Appellants
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
Robert J. Dale and Lynn C. McMurray, Salt
law. The proposed order characterized
Lake City, for Appellee
DeBrys' objections and additions as a motion
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and
pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Russon.
Procedure.3 DeBrys did not object to the
proposed order. Thereafter, on December 11,
1990, the trial court signed the order expressly
This opinion is subject to revision before
construing DeBrys' objections and additions
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
as a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rule
GARFF, Judge:
52(b). The court's order, a copy of which had
This is an appeal from a summary judgment been previously mailed to DeBrys' counsel on
dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs, Robert November 16, 1990, stated, "IT IS HEREBY
J. DeBry and Joan DeBry (DeBrys), against ORDERED that Plaintiffs^ motion pursuant
defendant Fidelity 'National Title Insurance to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Company (Fidelity). The summary judgment to amend the proposed Findings of Fact and
was certified by the trial court for appeal Conclusions of Law be and is hereby denied/
pursuant.to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil DeBrys did not file a notice of appeal after the
Procedure. The underlying action, which inv- court's December 11, 1990, order, nor did
olves multiple parties and multiple causes of they object to the order until some ten months
action, 1 stems from DeBrys' purchase of an later on October 21, 1991, when they filed a
office building. As a threshold matter, Fidelity motion to amend pursuant to Rule 60, Utah
claims that notice of appeal was not timely Rules of Civil Procedure. After oral argument,
4
filed,' and therefore/ this appeal should be the trial court denied the motion to amend.
dismissed. Because timely notice of appeal is
DeBrys argue that their document concerjurisdictional, Armstrong
Rubber Co. v. ning objections and additions to proposed
Bast/an, 657 P.2d 4346, 1348 (Utah 1983); findings of fact and conclusions of law was
Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah not a Rule 52(b) motion and that the trial
1983), we must first determine whether court erred in construing it as such.5 In deteDeBrys' notice of appeal was timely.
rmining whether the court properly characteOn March 28, 1990, after DeBrys and Fid- rized DeBrys' document, we look to the docelity presented oral argument, the trial court ument's substance rather than its caption. See
granted Fidelity's motion for summary judg- Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1347-48 (citing Howard
ment. The court directed Fidelity to prepare v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 152, ~ 356
and submit to the court proposed findings of P.2d 275, 276 (I960)); Gallardo v. Botindcr,
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in 800 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1990) (per curiam).
conformity with the court's ruling. Utah R. The court's conclusion that DeBrys' docuCiv. P. 52(a).
ment constituted a Rule 52(b) motion is legal
On April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered in nature; thus, it is accorded no particular
to DeBrys' counsel a copy of the proposed deference * and reviewed for correctness.
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and jud- Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d
gment. All other counsel were served by mail 467, 470 (Utah 1989); City of W. Jordan v.
on April 25, 1990. After allowing the five- Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah
day objections period to run, as specified in 1988); but see Valcnzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 521
UTAH ADVAN<CE REPORTS
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P.2d 1287, 1288-89 (Colo. a . App. 1974)
(reviewing for "abuse of discretion" trial
court's construction of motion to vacate as
motion to amend under Rule 59(e)).
DeBrys insist that their document concerning objections and additions to findings of
fact and conclusions of law should not have
been construed as a Rule 52(b) motion because
it did not constitute a "motion" per se> They
reason that because their document was an
objection and not a post-judgment motion,
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) does
not apply, and that their notice of appeal was
valid and that hence this court has jurisdiction
to hear the appeal.7
Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion
filed within ten days of the entry of judgment
that questions the correctness of the court's
findings and conclusions is properly treated as
a post-judgment motion under either Rules
52(b) or 59(e).« Armstrong. 657 P.2d at 134748; Gallardo, 800 P.2d at 817; Vreeken v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Cir. 1983). The
substance of a motion, not its caption, is
controlling.* See Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1348;
Gallardo, 800 P.2d at 817. In the instant case,
DeBrys' motion in substance requested the
trial court to amend and make additional
findings of fact and conclusions of law, a
request recognized by Rule 52(b). Furthermore, DeBrys' motion was timely inasmuch as
it was filed five days after entry of judgment.1*
Based on the circumstances and the substance of DeBrys' motion, the trial court did
not err in disposing of it as a post-judgment
motion pursuant to Rule 52(b).11
Moreover, because the trial court, under
Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, can still alter or amend the judgment, amend its findings, or make additional
findings, a notice of appeal is of no effect if
filed prior to the disposition of a postjudgment motion under any of these rules. "A
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of
a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective
to confer jurisdiction upon this court." Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723
P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); accord
Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d
1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); U-M Invs. v. Ray,
658 P.2d 1186, J186-87 (Utah 1982) (per
curiam). Once a timely post-judgment
motion is made pursuant to one of these rules,
to permit an appeal would be an affront to
judicial economy inasmuch as the very
purpose of such a motion is to allow a trial
court to correct its own errors, thus avoiding
needless appeals. Cf. U-M lnvs., 658 P.2d at
1187 (recognizing that the requirement of
filing a notice of appeal after disposition of a
post-judgment motion "may assist in discouraging delay in the judicial process"); 9
James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal
Practice 204.12[1], at 4-68, 4-69 & n.5 (2d

CODE # 0 0
Provo, Utah

ed. 1991) (stating that "[t]he very purpose of
such [post-judgment] motions is to permit
the trial court to correct its own errors, and
thus avoid needless appeals").
In the instant case, summary judgment was
entered on May 2, 1990. DeBrys filed their
Rule 52(b) motion on May 7, 1990, and their
notice of appeal on May 22, 1990. The trial
court denied DeBrys' Rule 52(b) motion on
December 11, 1990. No further appeal was
filed. As previously noted, Utah Rule of
AppeDate Procedure 4(b) requires the filing of
a new notice of appeal within the prescribed
time after entry of the trial court's order disposing of a Rule 52(b) post-judgment
motion. Because DeBrys failed to file a notice
of appeal after the court denied their postjudgment motion, we are without jurisdiction
and the appeal is dismissed.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
1. Appeals involving other parties in this action are
now before this court.
2. Rule 4-504(2) provides that "[cjopies of the
proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be
served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five days
after service/
3. Rule 52(b) provides in relevant part that *[u]pon
motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings
or make additional findings and may amend the
judgment accordingly."
4. The trial court's denial of the motion to amend is
the subject of a separate notice of appeal filed on
January 28,1992.
5. In addition, DeBrys contend that the court erred
by prematurely signing the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment before the time for
objections had run pursuant to Rule 4-504(2),
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. DeBrys'
counsel was served with a copy of the proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment
on April 24, 1990, and all other counsel were served
by mail on April 25, 1990. This service by mail, they
claim, added three days to their five-day objections
period of Rule 4-504(2), and therefore, all counsel
had until May 7, 1990, to file their objections. Utah
R. Civ. P. 6(a) and (e).
DeBrys' argument is without merit. They were
served with a copy of the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment on April 24, 1990.
Pursuant to the five-day objections period of Rule
4-504(2), excluding the intermediate Saturday and
Sunday as required by Rule 6(a), DeBrys* objections
were due May 1, 1990. On May 2, 1990, the trial
court signed and the clerk of the court entered the
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment.
Although the five-day objections period for
other counsel had not yet run, inasmuch as they
were served by mail on April 25, 1990, the court's
apparent oversight is inconsequential for two
reasons. First, no other parties had an interest in
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nor did they oppose Fidelity* s motion for summary
judgment. Second, no objections were filed by other
counsel, nor have other counsel complained that
they should have been allowed to file objections.
6. A motion is an application made to the court for
the purpose of obtaining a ruling or order directing
some act to be done in favor of the applicant. Elliot
v. Elliot. 797 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
7. Rule 4(b) provides in relevant part:
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure is tiled in the trial
court by any party ... under Rule 52(b)
to amend or make additional findings of
fact, whether or not an alteration of the
judgment would be required if the
motion is granted ... the time for appeal
for all parties shall run from the entry
of the order denying ... such motion. A
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall
have no effect. A new notice of appeal
must be filed within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order of
the trial court disposing of the motion
as provided above.
8. Rule 59(e) provides that "(a] motion to alter or
amend the judgment shall be served not later than
10 days after entry of the judgment. *
9. This is consistent with the requirement that the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure be liberally construed. Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a).
10. Additional reasons support the trial court's
construction of DeBrys' motion as a Rule 52(b) postjudgment motion. After filing then- motion, DeBrys
made no attempt to withdraw the motion, nor did
they attempt to communicate to the trial court that
it was not a post-judgment motion. Despite their
knowledge that judgment had been entered five days
prior to the filing of their motion, DeBrys proceeded to file a notice of appeal. Moreover, by receiving a copy of the proposed order almost a month
before the trial court's order disposing of their
motion* DeBrys were on notice that the court would
construe their motion as a Rule 52(b) postjudgment motion.
11. The instant case is readily distinguishable from
Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah
1991), where the Utah Supreme Court held that
motions for entry of findings, pursuant to Rule
52(a) or (b), filed after a trial court's granting of
summary judgment without findings of fact, does
not toll the time for appeal. Id. at 321-23. In
contrast, the trial court in the case at bar sua sponte
requested and signed findings of fact and conclusions of law after granting Fidelity's motion for
summary judgment. Moreover, DeBrys* postjudgment motion, in contrast with that filed in Ncerings, did not request an entry of findings;
rather it requested the trial court to amend and
make additional findings of fact and conclusions of
law.

Cite as
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IN T H E
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
Myrne M. COLLIER, as personal
representative of the Estate of James A.
Collier,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Kerry M. HEINZ and Southwest Virginia
Shopping Center Associates, a Utah limited
partnership,
Defendants and Appellant.
No. 900138-CA
FILED: March 19, 1992
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
ATTORNEYS:
James R. Brown, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
Randy S. Feil, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
ORME, Judge:
Defendant Heinz appeals the trial court's
judgment interpreting a settlement agreement
in favor of plaintiff, the personal representative of the Estate of James A. Collier. Heinz
also appeals the trial court's award of attorney fees to the estate. We affirm the trial
court's interpretation of the settlement agreement and reverse the award of attorney fees.
FACTS
Defendant Heinz and James Collier were
business partners in a number of general and
limited partnerships. Upon Collier's death,
Heinz and some of these partnerships brought
claims against Collier's estate relating to the
partnership agreements. Similarly, the estate
filed claims against Heinz and many of the
partnerships.
On February 12, 1988, after months of
negotiations, the estate and Heinz, both represented by counsel, entered into a settlement
agreement. In this agreement, Heinz gave up
certain rights and claims against the estate in
consideration for the estate's release of some
of its rights and claims against Heinz. Subsequent to this agreement, a dispute arose over
the rights of Heinz and the estate concerning
the distribution of assets from one of their
dissolved partnerships. Under the settlement
agreement, the estate maintained a fifty
percent general partnership interest in that
partnership. The trial court held that the lan-
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

^ t r ^ — ^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DE3RY,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS
AND ADDITIONS TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,

]

Defendants.
i

Civil No. C86-553

)

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,
Defendant.
Plaintiffs

submit

the

following

objections

and

additions to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
submitted by defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company.
GENERAL OBJECTION TO
PROP05ED FINDINGS Or FACT
Findings

of

fact

granting of summary judgment.

are

unnecessary

to

support

the

Mountain States v. Atkin, Wright s

Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); Rule 52(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

All that is required in this case is

that the court enter an order declaring its findings that because
it holds as a matter of law there were no disputed facts on
material issues, judgment was rendered for defendant.
There is an extensive record in this case.

As long as

the argument and issues have been raised before this Court, the
plaintiffs should be allowed, on appeal, to use any portion of
the record which supports their position.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Without waiving the General Objection just mentioned,
the plaintiffs submit the following specific objections to the
proposed Findings of Fact.
the

plaintiffs

do

not

By making these specific objections,

intend

to

:rposition to Fidelity's Motion.

resubmit

or

reargue their

The plaintiffs do, however,

*-ant to identify these issues which they contend are not properly
submitted as findings and/or are disputed in the record.
1.

Regarding finding number 1, the plaintiffs object

to the language "under construction" on the third line.

The fact

is the building was represented to be substantially completed and
a temoorary certificate of occupancy was produced at closing to
2

support the claim that with the exception of a few minor items
set

forth

on

said

certificate, the building

was completed.

Plaintiffs never intended and did not believe they were buying a
building which was "under construction."
2.

With respect to finding number 2, the comments to

number 1 above would apply.
3.
object

to

closing

With

the

must

to

finding

characterization

statement

language

respect

be

says.
read

number

by defendant

Specifically,
together

with

4, plaintiffs

as to what the

plaintiffs

the

approval*of plaintiffs of any dispersals.

language

claim the
requiring

The specific language

quoted is subject to the approval requirement.
4.

Plaintiffs

object

to

finding

number

5 on the

grounds the court made no findings at the hearing regarding the
manner or method of disbursement.
5.

With respect to paragraph 8, plaintiffs object to

the characterization
court

made

no

of the escrow agreements' meaning.

findings

thereon

and

the

document

The

speaks for

itself.
5.

With respect to paragraph 10, plaintiffs object to

the characterization

of

the

letter which

speaks

for itself.

Furthermore, the loan proceeds at that point belonged to DeErys
and such finding should be noted.
3

7.

There is a disputed fact issue as to the alleged

intent of the Woodbury escrow instructions which should be noted
in the findings.
8.

With respect to paragraph 12(b), it was and is the

position of plaintiffs that the agreement not to disperse was
both oral and in writing and the writing is evidenced by the
language of the closing statement.
9.
should

show

With
that

respect

to

plaintiffs'

paragraph
claims

12(c),

included

the
the

language
negligent

disbursal of the escrowed monies.
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The proposed Conclusions of Law contain unnecessary and
inappropriate restatement of the facts upon which the Conclusions
are based.

Conclusions

of law should

simply

set forth the

position of the Court as to the law applicable to the facts of
the case.
1.
conclusions.

Conclusions
The

legal

of law numbered
conclusion

ambiguous."

4

is

3 and 4 are mixed

"the

content

is not

2.

A specific finding should be included holding that

S 31A-23-308 does not apply to losses caused by negligence as
this finding was specifically made by the Court.
DATED this

day of May, 1990.
ROBERT J. DE3RY & ASSOCIATES
Attornevs for Plaintiffs

EDWARD T. WELLS

EXHIBIT E

Robert J. Dale, No. 0808
Lynn C. McMurray, No. 2213
Attorneys for Fidelity National
Title Insurance Company and
Co-counsel for Plaintiff
Canada Life Assurance Company
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5125
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS

ROBERT C. DEBRY AND JOAN DEBRY
Plaintiff,

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general
partnership, et. al.,
Defendants.

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,
Consolidated Civil No. C86-553
Plaintiff,
Judge Pat B. Brian
vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, an individual
et al.,
Defendants.

The Motion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance
Company ("Fidelity") for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs Robert
and Joan DeBry (collectively, "DeBrys") came on for hearing before
the above-entitled court on Wednesday, March 28, 1990, at of 1:00
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p.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding.
DeBrys were represented by Edward T. Wells of Robert J. DeBry &
Associates.

Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale

and Lynn C. McMurray of McMurray, McMurray, Dale and Parkinson.
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having
considered the memoranda submitted in support of and opposition to
the motion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully
and duly informed in the premises, the Court now enters the
following:

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

1.

Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry purchased

from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed
is referred to herein as the "Property").
2.

While the Building was still under construction,

DeBrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale.
3.

DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title & Abstract

Company ("Utah Title") , a local title company, for the closing (the
"Closing").

At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number of

closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents").
4.

One of the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and
-2-

Cascade was a closing statement (the "Closing Statement"), dated
December 13, 1985 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A
and made a part hereof) . Line 48 of the Closing Statement provided
for payment of $79,247.16 to be made to Cascade at the Closing.
Line 44 of the Closing Statement provided for the payment of an
estimated amount of $143,092.25 to subcontractors who had worked on
the

Building

(the

"Subcontractors").

The

Closing

Statement

specifically stated:
The undersigned Buyer [DeBrys] and Seller
[Cascade] hereby approve the foregoing
statement and authorize Utah Title & Abstract
Company, to complete the transaction in
accordance herewith. All instruments may
be delivered or recorded and funds disbursed,
[emphasis added].
5.

Pursuant to DeBrys1 and Cascade's Closing Statement,

Utah Title disbursed the $143,092.25 to the Subcontractors, but
only $57,323.34 to Cascade because the remaining $21,923.82 was
withheld from Cascade to pay off encumbrances on the Property
pursuant to Cascade's prior written authorization.

These amounts

were paid primarily from loan proceeds obtained by DeBrys from
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Richards-Woodbury").
6.

As a further part of the Closing, DeBrys also

executed a note payable to Cascade, secured by a trust deed on the
Property in the amount of $62,500.00, representing the balance of
the purchase price for the Building and Property to be paid by
-3-

DeBrys to Cascade (respectively, the "Note" and "Trust Deed"). The
$62,500.00 Note and Trust Deed were also agreed to in the written
Closing Statement at line 7.
7.

DeBrys received a warranty deed to the Property and

Building from Cascade at the Closing which was recorded.
8.

In connection with the Closing, DeBry, Cascade, and

Utah Title also signed a document entitled, "Escrow and Non-Merger
(DeBrys1

Agreement"

Escrow Agreement"), which was drafted

by

counsel for DeBrys and constituted one of the Closing Documents (a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part
hereof). Therein, DeBrys and Cascade agreed that although the work
of constructing the Building "has not been fully completed," and
although

"various

issues

concerning

the

construction

remain

unresolved," DeBrys and Cascade "will close on a closing statement
[the Closing Statement] based upon information which was primarily
supplied by Seller."
9.

DeBrys and Cascade further agreed in DeBrys' Escrow

Agreement that the Note and Trust Deed would be escrowed with Utah
Title as security to DeBrys for (a) Cascade's completion of the
Building; (b) Cascade's warranty of workmanship and materials for
the Building; and (c) other unresolved issues.

DeBrys' Escrow

Agreement specifically provided
that the amount of increase in allowances,
the decrease in the charge of any extras, the
-4-

increase in any credits, and the amount paid
by Buyers [the DeBrys] for work which is
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic,1
to perform which the parties agree to or which
a Court or other authority orders Buyers are
entitled tof shall be deducted from the
amount owed Seller under the Promissory Note
rthe Note! and Trust Deed. Until the disputes
which exists rsic.] concerning allowances,
extras, credits and unfinished work are
resolved either by Agreement or otherwise,
Buyers may also deduct all funds owed it
rsic.] under the warranty described in
paragraph 2 [Cascade's warranty for workmanship and materials] and Seller's obligation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's
indemnification against mechanic's liens]
from the amounts owed under the Promissory
Note and Trust Deed [emphasis added].

10.

By letter dated December 16, 1985 (three days

after the date of the signed Closing Statement) , Mr. Jeffrey K.
Woodbury ("Woodbury") , attorney for Richards-Woodbury, gave written
escrow instructions to Utah Title on behalf of Richards-Woodbury
(the "Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions;" a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof).

Richards-

Woodbury therein instructed Utah Title to clear from the Property
specifically identified liens, encumbrances, and "clouds on the
title" of the Property listed in Utah Title's commitment for a
lender's title insurance policy (the "Commitment"). Utah Title was
expressly authorized in the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions
to

use

Richards-Woodbury's

loan

encumbrances and "clouds on title."
-5-

proceeds

to

clear

those

11.

The Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions further

stated:
After you have determined that all the liens
and clouds on the property [the Property]
have been satisfied and removed and that the
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above
[the Trust Deed on the Property securing
Richards-Woodbury's loan to Debrys] will be
a first lien, vou may disburse the remaining
funds from the check described in paragraph
8. above [the $485,973.35 check representing
the total loan proceeds from Richards-Woodburyfs
loan to Debrys] to Cascade Enterprises
[emphasis added].

In drafting the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, Woodbury
did not intend by the words "clouds on the property*1 to refer to
Cascade's allegedly not having a contractor's license or building
permit to construct the Building. Moreoever, the Richards-Woodbury
Escrow Instructions said nothing about Cascade's having or not
having a contractor's license or building permit, and specifically
did not refer to any lack of a contractor's license or building
permit by Cascade as a "cloud" on the Property's title.
12.

DeBrys filed this action against Cascade and others

for the alleged faulty construction of the Building.

DeBrys named

Utah Title as one of many defendants and asserted the following
claims against Utah Title:
a.

That

Cascade

did

not have

a

license or building permit to construct the Building.

contractor's
DeBrys

claimed that this constituted a "cloud" on the title of the

Property pursuant to the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions,
that they are beneficiaries of those escrow instructions, and that
even though the Closing Statement they signed expressly authorized
Utah Title to disburse, Utah Title should not have disbursed to
Cascade because Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor's license and
building permit.
b.

That Utah Title orally agreed not to disburse

any_funds to the seller (Cascade) or the Subcontractors until the
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys.
c.

That Utah Title is liable to DeBrys for

allegedly negligently misrepresenting to DeBrys that it would not
disburse any funds to Cascade and the Subcontractors until the
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys.
13.

Since the filing of this action, DeBrys have amended

their Complaint and added Fidelity as a party Defendant.

In their

Fourth Amended Complaint, which is the governing complaint in this
action, DeBrys alleged that Fidelity was a title underwriter of
Utah Title for the purpose of issuing title policies, and that
pursuant to §31A-23-308, Utah Code Annotated (UCA), Fidelity is
liable for Utah Title's alleged misconduct. §31A-23-308 states, in
relevant part:
Any title company represented by one or more
title insurance agents, is directly and
primarily liable to others dealing with the
title insurance agents for the receipt and
-7-

disbursement of funds deposited in escrows,
closings, or settlements with the title
insurance agents in all those transactions
where a commitment or binder for or policy
or contract of title insurance of that title
insurance company has been ordered, or a
preliminary report of the title insurance
company has been issued or distributed.
14.

After Fidelity was brought into this action as a

party Defendant by DeBrys, Utah Title filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
petition, which was later converted to a Chapter 7.

The Chapter 7

proceeding is still pending.
15.

Robert DeBry was at all times relevant an attorney

licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.

The DeBrys were

also represented by other counsel at the Closing who drafted some
of the Closing Documents, including DeBry's Escrow Agreement.
16.

Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed

after the discovery cut-off date in the above-entitled action.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based on the foregoing undisputed material facts, the
Court hereby enters the following conclusions of law:

1.

Any lack of a contractor's license or building

permit by Cascade did not create a cloud on the title to the
Property.
-8-

2.

Neither the December 16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury

Escrow Instructions nor any of the Closing Documents required Utah
Title to determine whether Cascade had a contractor's license or a
building permit.
3.

There is no ambiguity in the Closing Documents,

including without limitation in the Closing Statement or DeBrys1
Escrow Agreement.

If there were any ambiguities in DeBrys1 Escrow

Agreement, they would be construed against DeBrys, who prepared the
document.
4.

The alleged ambiguity asserted by DeBrys with

respect to line 44 of the Closing Statement is easily clarified,
reconciled, and construed by reference to the Closing Documents
themselves without the need for any parol evidence.
5.

The Closing Documents authorized immediate

disbursement of the amounts due Subcontractors (line 44 of the
Closing Statement) and the balance owing to Seller (line 48 of the
Closing Statement) without further approval by DeBrys.

The oral

agreements alleged by DeBrys are inconsistent with the written
Closing Documents, and the parol evidence rule prohibits the
introduction of any evidence of such inconsistent oral agreements.
6.

The

December

16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury

Escrow

Instructions were intended to protect someone other than DeBrys.
DeBrys are not third-party beneficiaries of the December 16, 1985
Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions and have no standing to
-9-

assert any alleged violation of those instructions.
7.

There was no violation of the Closing Documents by

Utah Title, and there was no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah
Title in connection with the Closing.
8.

Fidelity is not liable to DeBrys under §31A-23-308,

Utah Code Annotated.

Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to

DeBrys in connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement
regarding the Property.
9.

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact,

Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeBrys as a matter of law,
and Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment against DeBrys should be
granted.
10.

As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil

» Procedure, there is no just reason for delay, and Fidelity is
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor.
Dated this

day of

, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR

tJr
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered this '2j± 'day of April, 1990,
to:
Edward T. Wells
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
J

v

/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid,
this

day of April, 1990 to:

Thomas Grisley
Roy G. Haslam
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
#185 So. State Street, #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Cascade Construction
c/o Del Bartel
P. 0. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Paul
SALT
2001
Salt

Cascade Enterprises
c/o Dale Thrugood
4455 South 700 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Jeff Silvestrini
COHNE, RAPPAPORT 7 SEGAL
P. 0. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

Del Bartel
P. 0. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Robert Hughes
50 West 300 South, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Dale Thurgood
4455 South 700 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Randall L. Skeen
1245 East Brickyard Rd., #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Lee Allen Bartel
110 Merrimac Court
Vallejo, California

Craig Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
425 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

94859

Maughan
LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
South State Street
Lake City, Utah 84116

Stanley Postma
2571 South 75 West
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Van Ellsworth
1414 Laburnum Street
McLean, Virginia 22101

Richard Carling
SHEARER & CARLING
200 South Main Street, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

D. Michael Nielsen
Session Place
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84 010

Glen Roberts
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER
2677 Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

Darwin C. Hansen
MORGAN & HANSEN
136 South Main, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Cascade Construction
c/o Del Barrel
?. 0. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Paul Maughan
SALT. LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
2001 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

Cascade Enterprises
c/o Dale Thrugood
4455 South 700 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Jeff Silvestrini
COHNE, RAPPAPORT 7 SEGAL
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

Del 3artel
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Murray, Utah 84107

Robert Hughes
50 West 3 00 South, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101

Dale Thurgood
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Randall L. Skeen
1245 East Brickyard Rd., #600
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110 Merrinac Court
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Darvin C. Hansen
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EXHIB:

L"

Robert. J. Dale, No. 080'8
Lynn C. McMurray, No. 2213
Attorneys for Fidelity Nations 1
Title Insurance Company and
Co-counsel for Plaintiff
Canada Life Assurance Company
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IS THE THIRD JUDICIAL" DISTRICT COURT
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT C. DEBPY AND JOAN DESR^
i !

CASCADE ENTERPRISES
., i
pa.rt.ne:rsn:

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS

1

Defend.:,

CANADA

LI:FS

ASSURANCZ COMPANY,:
Consolidated

Civil Nc. C36-553

I- Id.,1",: i

vs.
R03ERT u •

e-

DEBRY, an i ncivld.ua] :

al. t

Defence.nis.

The Motion cf Defendant Fidel: :v Na-:?.-,:
Ccir.pa-v ("7: ,\,(•••].
and J sari Deijyy

"i

,

u.

u'.'.,^',

s^..:^t

. 1 ^ i n : : . i1 is I\c berr

(collectively, "DeBrys") cane en f c r

the ahsve-er.~it.Ied court, on Wednesday

>«.,..-i. • • ?

h e s r i n q befcre

p.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding.
De3rys were represented by Edward T. Wells of Robert J. DeBry «
Associates.

Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale

and Lynn C. McMurray of McMurray, McMurray, Dale and Parkinson.
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having
considered the memoranda submitted in support of and opposition to
the motion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully
and duly

informed in the premises, the Court now enters the

following:

FTKDINGS 0? UNDISPUTED MATERIA FACTS

1.

Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry purchased

from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed
is referred to herein as the "Property").
2.

While the Building was still under consrruc-icn,

DeSrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale.
2.

DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title £ Abstract

Company ("Utah Title"), a local title company, for the closing (the
"Closing").

At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number of

closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents").
4.

One cf the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and
-2 —

C*rc.?*de w..i • ;s closing statement, (the "C'losina St;?,*; eimr;
D'",",;esir>er 12IIP 2 9 a , r

"T"",1" ..)"• ?h i :li i::« attached hereto as Exhibit A

| ,„i,

. ,i^c. a, p a r t ^ r ^ / i "
ior

' :!:i(:ed

' ,,.7,^ VIS zt "t^e Closing St^t.e^ert. tr?Ari;itvi

p a y m e n t of $79,247 .16 to !'• * inad* * : "*:• \"' ::*c'• ;" ' ' , , ,i , '. Losmg,

';

n< ••!•

IJJ",'"i"1., ::-"iiatement provided for the payment of an

•*'.. i-mated amount of $14 3,092.23 to subcontractors who had worVcS
tine

Building

specif"* r:r» ' i

(the

,,f

Subcontract::rnr " -.

"IMUI L : oL-.n:?

;jtatene:it

.•-'. '•.".! The undersigned 3uyer [DeBrys] a n d Seller
[Cascade] hereby approve t h e f o r e g o i n g
statement and authorize Utah Title «
kbszzi:".
Company., to complete t h e t r a n s a c t i o n In
accordance herewith. All i n s t r u m e n t s r.a11"
be delivered or recorded and funds disbursed.
[emphasis a d d e d ] ,

5.

Pursuant to DeBrys' and Cascade's Closing Statement,
*"he S K ^ . O ^ : ?ri

U t a h T i t l e disbursed
cni,,

r r - -»

vitnrield

iron Cascade

' ^ ; *"

iiij^^nuractors,

-,:a:e ueciusa "che r e m a i n i n g
:; ;» pr>" uff encumbrances

p u r s u a n t t:: cascade's tr:"*- »
ver

ii

- •*.>•.'.. . ! M I : ---

L'JT

?ri,523*sr was
r *i '" *

n -•-:t'::ta(.„icn.

••. "ip^-.y

These amounts

1 -i. .i proceeds o b t a i n e d

by DeBrys

from

R i c h a r d s - W o o d b u r y Mortgage Corporation ("Pianards-Woor.^"' i"').
6.

A s a furr^ip

'

•

losing, DeBrys clso

n^pi , i-:i':, ' i ,e payable to Cascade, secured by a trust. ^e«l cr the
Prcmertv

1' . ne amount cf $62,5 ?0 00 re?TPSf' n " ,

,..:!.d-... c:

DeBrys to Cascade (respectively, the "Note" and "Trust Deed"). The
$62,500.00 Note and Trust Deed were also agreed to in the written
Closing Statement at line 7.
7.

DeBrys received a warranty deed to the Property and

Building from Cascade at the Closing which was recorded.
8.

In connection with the Closing, De3ry, Cascade, and

Utah Title also signed a document entitled, "Escrow and Non-Merger
Agreement"

(De3rys* Escrow Agreement"), which was drafted by

counsel for DeBrys and constituted one of the Closing Documents (a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 3 and made a part
hereof) . Therein, DeBrys and Cascade agreed that although the work
of constructing the Building "has not been fully completed," and
although

"various

issues

concerning

the

construction

remain

unresolved," De3rys and Cascade "will close on a closing statement
[the Closing Statement] based upon information which was primarily
sumo^ied bv Seller*"
9.

DeBrys and Cascade further agreed in DeBrys' Escrow

Agreement that the Note and Trust Deed would be escrowed with Utah
Title as security to DeBrys for (a) Cascade's completion of the
Building; (b) Cascade's warranty of workmanship and materials for
the Building; and (c) other unresolved issues.

DeBrys1 Escrow

Agreement specifically provided
that the amount cf increase in allowances,
the decrease in the charge cf any extras, the
-4-

£ n c r e a s e . £ n aily creciits; .and the amount paid
by Buyers [the DeBrys] for work which is
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic,1
to perform which the parties agree to or whicn
a Court or other authority orders Buyers are
entitled tcf shall be deducted from the
amount owed Seller under the Promissory Note
rthe Notel and Trust Deed, Until the disputes
which exists fsic,] concerning allowances,
extras, credits and unfinished work are
resolved either by Agreement or otherwise,
3uvers mav also deduct all funds owed -it
rsic.] under the warranty described in
paragraph 2 [ Cascadels warranty for workmanship and "materials] and Seller's obligation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's
indemnification against mechanic's liens]
from the amounts owed under the Promissory
Note and•Trust Deed [emphasis added].
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11.

The Richards -Woodbury Escrow Instructions further

stated:
After you have determined that all the liens
and clouds on the property [the Property]
have been satisfied and removed and that the
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above
[the Trust Deed on the Property securing
Richards-Woodbury's loan to Debrys] will be
a first lien, vou nav disburse the remaining
funds from the check described in oaracraoh
8. above [the $485,973.25 check representing
the total loan proceeds from Richards-Woodbury's
loan to Debrys] to Cascade Enterprises
[emphasis added].

In drafting the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, Woodbury
did not intend bv the words "clouds on the orooertv" to refer to
Cascadefs allegedly not having a contractor's license or building
permit to construe- the 3uilding. Moreoever, the Richards-Woodbury
Escrow Instructions said nothing about Cascadefs having cr net
having a contractor's license or building permit, and specifically
did not refer to any lack cf a contractor's license cr building
permit by Cascade as a "cloud" on the ?rcoertvfs title.
12.

DeSrvs filed this action acair.st Cascade and ethers

for the alleced faultv construction cf the Buildinc.

DeErys named

Utah Title as one cf many defendants and asserted the following
claims acainst Utah Title:
a.

That

Cascade

did

not

have

a

license cr buildinc oermit to construct the Building.

contractor's
DeErys

claimed that this constituted a "cloud" on the title of the

Property pursuant *•
, ii' .a^j

'ii . ;L,K it., w -ciu;., Escrow Ins-tractions,

\ i jei'ieixciaries of Miose escrow instructions, and tb.st

even though the Closing Statement they ri cried n .-«•*• nt t(
Utah Title r? d i :iN.

-

, Ia

' ,li

|

i.jjjjrized

. iiuuici i.-t. have disbursed to

u,.>L,du<r l;>ecause Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor's license and
building pernit.
a.

x i

'

]i ..Lie orally agreed not to disburse
i *'he Subcontractors i;:," "li h.he

a::y_;unos to the seller (Cascade)
Building was completed and .,jrrp
c.

P*

' i:i.:s.
fcr

That Utah Title is liable to De3rys

allegedly negligently misrepresenting t? Dr.E:-,Tr»

:

disburse anv fun,,:, • ' i

the

bu.

SL.ILI

_nu t.ai: Dubcuntractors i::"t
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i,. :; /jaencei Complaint, whicn is the governing cor.tlair
action r De3rvs alleged that
Utan T **" »
pursuant
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L '.. 11» uncervrnei cf

.ssuing title policies, ^nd

::, <, 21A-12-3 03r Utah Code Annotated

liable for Utah Title's al'ecp' r r>'':r • i

fire."*- "
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tl^r
'

v..-—"-^ --Ud states, in

Any title company represented - •
_ :t
; -.^
title insurance agents, is directly and
primarily liable to ctners dealing vitn the
title insurance acents for tne receirt and

disbursement of funds deposited in escrows,
closings, or settlements with the title
insurance agents in all those transactions
where a commitment or binder for or policy
or contract of title insurance of that title
insurance company has been ordered, or a
preliminary report of the title insurance
commany has been issued or distributed.
14.

After Fidelity was brought into this action as a

parry Defendant by De3rys, Utah Title filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
petition, which was later converted to a Chapter 7.

The Chapter 7

proceeding is still pending.
15.

Robert DeBry was at ail times relevant an attorney

licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.

The De3rys were

also represented by other counsel at the Closing who drafted some
of the Closing Documents, including De3ryfs Escrow Agreement.
IS.

Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed

after the discovery cut-off date in the above-entitled action.

CONCLUSIONS O? LA^

Based en the foregoing undisputed material facts, the
Court hereby enters the following conclusions of law:

1.

Any lack of a contractor's license or building

permit by Cascade did net create a cloud en the title to the
Prooertv.

2.

Neither the December 16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury

Escrow Instructions nor any of the Closing Documents required Utah
Title to determine whether Cascade had a-contractor's license or a
building permit.
3.

There is no ambiguity in the Closing Documents,

including without limitation i: the Closing Statement or DeBrys1
Escrow Agreement. If there were any ambiguities in De3rys' Escrow
Agreement, they would be construed against DeBrys, who prepared the
document.
4.

The alleged ambiguity asserted by DeBrys with

respect to line 44 of the Closing Statement is easily clarified,
reconciled, and construed by reference to the Closing Documents
themselves without the need for any parol evidence.
5.

The Closing Documents authorized immediate

disbursement of the amounts due Subcontractors (line 44 of the
•Closing Statement) and the balance owing I O Seller (line 43 of the
Closing Statement) without further approval by DeBrys.

The oral

agreements alleged by DeBrys are inconsistent: with the written
Closing

Documents, and the parol evidence rule prohibits the

introduction cf any evidence of such inconsistent oral agreements.
6.

The December

15, 19S5

Richards-Woodbury Escrow-

Instructions were intended to protect someone other than De3rys.
DeBrys are not third-party benefioiaries of the December 15, 1985
Richards-wccdbury Escrow Instructions and have no standing to

assert any alleged violation of those instructions.
7.

There was no violation of the Closing Documents by

Utah Title, and there was no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah
Title in connection with the Closing.
8.

Fidelity is not liable to De3rys under §3lA-23-3 08,

Utah Code Annotated.
DeBrys

Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to

in connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement

regarding the Property,
9.

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact,

Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeBrys as a matter of law,
and Fidelity's Motion fcr Summary Judgment against De3rys should be
granted.
10.

As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, there is no just reason fcr delay, and Fidelity is
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor.
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DS3RY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84 107
Telephone:
(001) 252-8S15
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 0? ' :HE

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC:

IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT.J. DEBRY and JOAN DE3RY,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,

vs .
Civil Nc. CSS-553
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
INSURANCE C O . , et ai . ,
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN
Defendants.
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hereby

p laintif :s herein

OeBry,
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is

in
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cf

ntered herein on May 2,
a

final

order

Fidelity

National

Title
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pursuant

to

?.uie 54(b) cf

the

F.ules cf Civil Procedure on Mav 2 , 1990
DATED this /JjA

cav of !'.av, 1990.
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Attomevs
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CERTIFICATE 0? MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
NOTICE 0? APPEAL (DeBry v. Cascade, et al.) was mailed, on the
^?JD
cay of Kay, 1990, to the following:
Cascade Construction
Robert Huches
c/o Del Bartel
50 West 300 South #1000
P.O. Box 7234
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Hurray, UT 84107
Randall L. Skeen
Cascade Enterprises
12 4 5 East Brickyard Rd. =500
c/o Dale Thurcooc
Salt Lake City,"uT S4105
4435 South 700 East #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Thomas Grisley
Roy G. Haslam
Dei Bartel
185 South State #700
P.O. Box 7234
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Murray, UT • G4107
D. Kichael Nielsen
Dale Thurgood
505 South Kain Street
4455 South 700 East =300
Bountiful, UT 84 010
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Darwin C Hansen
r,£o Allen Bartel
135 South Kain, Eichth Floor
110 Merrimac Court
Salt Lake City, UT* 84101
Vaiiejo, CA 94582
Craic Peterson
425 Scutn 500 East
Glen Roberts
Salt
Lake City, UT 84102
2 5 77 Parley's Way
Van Ellsworth
14 14 Laburnum Street
McLean, VA 22101

Stanley Pcstr.a
2571 Scruth 7 3 West
Bountiful, UT S-.CiO

Ken Bartel
,i:oo C lav Star Rd

Lynn KcMurray
425 East 500*South #30
c^i- 'a'/o r:t*v u,n h.:**'1

o
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per *, « •' :*<

Lynn C. McMurray, #2213
McKURRAY, McKURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
Attorneys for Fidelity National Title
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
ROBERT J. DEBRY AND JOAN DEBRYf

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO
AMEND PROPOSED FINDINGS CF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C36-553
vs.
Judge Pat B. 3rian
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general
partnership, et. al.,
Defendants.
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, an individual
Defendants.
On Wednesday, March 28, 1990, the Court heard and granted
the notion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company
for surjnary judgment against Plaintiffs Rcbert and Jean DeBry
Thereafter, en May 2, 199 0, the Court entered its Findings of
FIDE-DEE.Orw/lCM/effi

Undisputed Material Facts and Conclusions of Lav on Fidelity
National Title Insurance Company's Motion for summary .Judgment)
and its Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant Fidelity National
Title Insurance Company Against Plaintiffs Robert J, DeBry and
Joan De3ry.

Thereafter, on May 4, 1990, Plaintiff submitted

Plaintiff's Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Lav.

No party having requested oral argument,

and the Court being fully and duly informed in the premises, and
good cause appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs1 motion pursuant to
Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the proposed
Findincs of Fact and Conclusions pi. Law be and is herebv denied.
DATED this

// day o^November, 1990,
BY THE COURT:

^—\

P£r 5. Brian,
District Judge
Attorneys for Defendant

I hereby certify that Z mailed a copy cf the foregoing Order
Denying Plaintiff's Objections and Motion to Amend Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions cf Lav, first-Cj.ass postage
thereon fully prepaid this 11/°^ day cf November, 199 0, to:

c
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Thomas Grisley
Roy G. Kaslam
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
#185 So. State Street, #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Curtis J. Drake
Michael A. Peterson
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110

Cascade Construction
c/o Del Bartel
P. 0. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Paul
SALT
2001
Salt

Cascade Enterprises
c/o Dale Thurgood
4455 South 700 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Jeff Silvestrini
COKNE, RAPPAPORTfieSEGAL
P. O, Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84In7

Del 3artel
P. 0. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Robert Hughes
50 West 300 South, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Dale Thurgood
4455 South 700 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Randall L. Skeen
1245 East Brickyard Rd., #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Lee Allen Bartel
110 Merrinac Court
Vailejo, California

Craig Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
425 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

94859

Maughan
LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
South State Street
Lake City, Utah 84116

Stanley Postsia
2571 South 7 5 West
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Van Ellsworth
1414* Laburnum Street
McLean, Virginia 22101

Richard Carling

D. Michael Nielsen
Session Place
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010

SKU-^ZR

« CARLING

2650 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 S. State St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Glen Roberts
WOODBURY, BETTILYON * KESLER
2 677 Parley 1 s Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

Darwin C. Hansen
MORGAN £ HANSEN
13 6 South Main, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Edward T. Weils
ROBERT J. DeBRY * ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 Eas~
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

f]^.r,'SL,{),,
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EXHIBIT J

subjects addressed in the parol agreements.

A finding of

integration is, nonetheless, implicit in the trial court's
Findings of Fact.
5.
Fidelity is not liable under S31A-23-308 for Utah
Title's alleged negligent misrepresentation tort.
That statute contains absolutely no language making an
underwriter liable for the torts of its title insurance agents.
DeBrys1 common law agency argument against Fidelity in its brief
was not pleaded or argued below, is not supported in the record,
is being raised for the first time on appeal, and is the subject
of a totally separate lawsuit filed by DeBrys.

Moreover,

negligent misrepresentation cannot be based on an alleged
misrepresentation of a "future event," as opposed to a
representation of an existing material fact.
IX.
1.

ARGUMENT

THIS APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED AMD SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
Two days after the Court below entered Summary Judgment in

favor of Fidelity, DeBrys filed a motion to amend and make
additions to the findings of fact.

Before the district court

entered its order denying their motion, DeBrys filed their only
notice of appeal ever filed.

Under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, DeBrys' notice of appeal has no effect:
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court
by any party . . . (2) under Rule 52(b) to
amend or make additional findings of fact,
the time for appeal for all parties shall run
from the entry of the order denying a new
trial or granting or denying any other such
motion . . . A notice of appeal filed before
the disposition of any [such motion] shall
have no effect. A new notice of appeal must
be filed within the prescribed time measured
from the entry of the order of the trial

court disposing of the motion as provided
above [emphasis added].
On December 11, 1990, the trial court denied DeBrys1 motion
in an order stating as follows in relevant part:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs1 Motion
pursuant to Rule 52 (b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to amend the proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law be and is hereby
denied. (R. 12917; App. Z).
The 30 day period for filing DeBrys' Notice of Appeal thus began
to run on December 11, 1990, and DeBrys1 prior May 22, 1990
Notice of Appeal therefore was filed prematurely and was totally
ineffective.
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held in Transamerica
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen. 723 P.2d 425 (Utah 1986), that a
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a post-judgment
motion is ineffective to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme
Court.

Also, in Anderson v. Schwendiman. 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct.

App. 1988) , this Court held that a post-judgment motion like this
suspends the finality of the judgment, and that a notice of
appeal filed prior to the disposition of such a motion by entry
of a signed order is not effective to confer jurisdiction on an
appellate court.

Because DeBrys filed their notice of appeal

before obtaining a ruling on their proposed additions to the
findings of fact, their notice of appeal was ineffective to
confer jurisdiction on this Court, and this appeal therefore
should be dismissed.

2.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW ONLY THOSE CLAIMS RAISED IN DEBRYS9
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND IGNORE THOSE ISSUES NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE IT.

